Mako’s last cum-ex fine was for trades that went round in a circle
On 18 February 2025 the FCA fined the brokerage £1,662,700 and closed its cum-ex investigations. Between 2013 and 2015 Mako executed purported Danish and Belgian equity trades of about £92 billion for Solo Group clients, and took a Dubai payment for their debts without asking who was paying.
The eighth case, and the number that is not all penalty
On 18 February 2025 the Financial Conduct Authority fined Mako Financial Markets Partnership LLP £1,662,700. The notice is dated 17 February. Of that penalty, £1,137,283 is disgorgement. Mako did not dispute the findings and settled, which took 30 percent off. Without the discount the Authority would have imposed £1,887,800. The press release calls this the eighth enforcement case the FCA has brought on cum-ex trading, and the one that concludes those investigations. Across the set, the Authority says, it has imposed fines of more than £30 million, working with European and other law-enforcement agencies. A last case is still a case. It is not a footnote because the programme is closing. The conduct sits in December 2013 to November 2015. On behalf of clients of the Solo Group, Mako executed purported over-the-counter equity trades worth about £68.6 billion in Danish equities and £23.6 billion in Belgian equities. Commission was about £1.45 million, around 12 percent of Mako’s revenue in the period. The notice’s adjective is “purported.” Use it. The Authority is describing trading that had the shape of a market and, on its findings, the purpose of a tax reclaim. It is not inviting you to treat every OTC equity print in Copenhagen in 2014 as fiction. It is describing this book. The shape was circular. Extremely high-value OTC equity trades, back-to-back securities lending, and forwards, in EU equities on or around the last cum-dividend day, then purportedly reversed. The press release says the trading appears to have been carried out to allow withholding-tax reclaims in Denmark and Belgium, and that several individuals have now been convicted in Denmark as part of the scheme. Convictions are the Danish courts’ record. They are not a finding, in this notice, that Mako shared a criminal purpose. The FCA’s findings against the firm are systems and conduct: Principle 3, for failing to organise itself so as to guard against financial crime, and Principle 2, for failing to apply with due skill the policies it did have. Those are the findings to file. The criminal cases are a different file, and they should stay labelled as criminal cases.
What the book looked like up close
The notice gives the volume in a form a markets person can check. In Danish stocks, Mako purportedly executed orders in 16 names over 22 cum-dividend dates. On average about 20 percent of the shares outstanding in each stock were traded, cumulatively £68.6 billion, equal to about 56 times the shares traded in those stocks on European exchanges. In Belgian stocks, 15 names over 14 dates, on average 6.21 percent of shares outstanding, £23.6 billion, about 23 times exchange volume. A print that large, on the dividend date, in a circle, is the red flag. It does not require a specialist in Scandinavian tax to see that the strategy was not “we like the stock.” Mako onboarded 242 Solo clients. None was a regulated firm. About 92 percent had only recently been incorporated. About 26 percent were in jurisdictions the notice describes as lacking AML requirements equivalent to the UK, including the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands and the UAE. They were introduced by the Solo Group, whose owner the notice identifies as Sanjay Shah, a British national based in Dubai. Some beneficial owners were former employees of a Solo firm, which the Authority treats as a conflict: the introducer was not in a position to give an unbiased view for due diligence. Before onboarding, Mako had limited information on who the clients were and what the strategy was. The clients were a departure from Mako’s usual book, which the notice describes as regulated institutional clients, typically in the EU. The moment of onboarding was the moment the firm learned the name, the structure and the jurisdiction. That is late for a book of this size, and it is when the questions should have got harder rather than easier. The Authority also records the tax figures it attributes to the Solo Group, which are not the same thing as Mako’s commission. Withholding-tax reclaims attributable to the group were about £899.27 million on the Danish side and £188 million on the Belgian side. Of those, the Danish authorities paid about £845.90 million and the Belgian authorities about £42.33 million. Faircroft is not relitigating those reclaims. They explain why a circular dividend trade is not a curiosity. The firm’s own revenue from the flow was £1.45 million. The public consequence, on the FCA’s numbers, was measured in hundreds of millions at the tax authorities. A brokerage that earns a small commission on a very large circle is still the firm that printed the circle.
A loss that moved money, and a payment from Dubai
In June 2014 Mako executed a series of trades in a German stock for four Solo clients. The notice’s detailed account puts the loss at EUR 2,073,291. Three clients, owned by associates of Mr Shah, bought at one price. Ganymede Cayman Ltd, owned by Mr Shah, sold to them. The trades then reversed at a higher price, so Ganymede bought back from the same three and took the loss. Commission to Mako on that set was EUR 10,534.91. The Authority says the trades had no apparent economic purpose except to move funds from an entity Mr Shah controlled to his associates. They were reversed within about an hour. They were not the cum-ex book. They were easier to read than the cum-ex book, which is why they matter. A firm that cannot see a same-day round trip that hands two million euros to the introducer’s associates is not going to see a dividend-day circle either. Ganymede’s onboarding request arrived on 17 June 2014. The company had a sole director and shareholder: Mr Shah. Had Mako looked through to the beneficial owners on the other side of the print, the notice says, it would have seen that connection, including beneficiaries who were current or former employees of a Solo firm. The possibility that the trades were a way to move money is the possibility the Authority says the firm ought to have reached. “Ought to have” is a diligence finding. It is not a court finding that the brokerage stole the money. On 16 November 2015 Mako received EUR 177,699.19 from Elysium Global (Dubai) Limited, a UAE company connected to the Solo Group, to buy the debts the Solo clients owed the firm. Mako had not heard of Elysium, did no due diligence, and had no written agreement. The payment came after an unannounced FCA visit on 3 November 2015, in which the Authority raised possible issues around the Solo Group, and after news reports of investigations. A third-party payer, in a higher-risk jurisdiction, settling a client’s debt in the fortnight after a supervisor has walked in unannounced, is the sort of receipt a financial-crime team exists to stop. The notice treats the acceptance of that payment as part of the same Principle 2 and Principle 3 failures.
What this is for
This page will not retry anyone convicted in Denmark, and it will not say Mako designed the reclaims. It will say the firm executed the purported trades, took the commission, missed the circularity, missed the Ganymede loss, and took the Elysium money. For a broker, a clearer, or a custodian that still sees dividend-day OTC flow, the checks are ordinary and they were available in 2014. Who is the beneficial owner. How recently was the company formed. Is the print a large share of the stock on the cum-day, and does it reverse. Who is paying the invoice if it is not the client. Write the answers down before the trade, not after a visit. Keep the notice, not the cum-ex explainer. The figures to retain are the £68.6 billion and £23.6 billion, the £1.45 million commission, the EUR 2,073,291 loss, and the EUR 177,699.19 from Dubai. The disgorgement inside the fine is the part that matches the commission. The rest of the story is a tax scheme other people have been convicted for. Mako’s public record is that it did not have, and did not apply, the controls that would have kept it out of the print.