Monzo grew to millions of customers before the address check came back

The FCA’s July 2025 notice fines the bank £21.1 million. For most of the period before a formal requirement landed, onboarding did not verify the address, and landmark addresses got through.

Unbranded bank interior seen through glass at dusk
London · Banking A branch window at dusk. The notice is about onboarding, not the glass.

The fine, and the period it actually covers

On 8 July 2025 the Financial Conduct Authority published a final notice fining Monzo Bank Ltd £21,091,300. The notice is dated 7 July. Monzo agreed to resolve the case and took the Authority’s 30 percent stage-one discount. Without that discount the penalty would have been £30,130,475. The Authority imposed it under section 206 of the Financial Services and Markets Act for a breach of Principle 3 and for contravening a voluntary requirement. The FCA’s own note on the release says this was the tenth fine it had imposed on a bank for financial-crime control failings in the previous four years. That sentence is the context. The file is the notice. The controls finding covers October 2018 to August 2020. In that window the Authority says Monzo failed to design, implement and maintain adequate customer onboarding, customer risk assessment and transaction monitoring. Growth is the fact the press release puts next to that sentence. The customer base rose from around 600,000 in 2018 to over 5.8 million in 2022, almost tenfold, while the controls did not keep the same pace. The notice also records a later figure of 7.4 million in the customer table. Use the press-release pair when you are summarising. Use the notice when you are quoting a column. They are the same story told at two levels of precision. A fast bank is not, on these pages, a suspicion. A fast bank with a written risk appetite it could not test is the finding. Monzo’s policy was to serve customers based in the United Kingdom. For most of the period before the requirement, it had stopped verifying addresses for certain personal customers, and so it could not show that the book stayed inside that appetite. The firm later accepted it could not confirm that all customers were UK-based.

What “no address check” produced

The notice is plain about the onboarding design. Identity verification compared a selfie video and a date of birth with a photograph on a government document. A separate “2+2” check compared name, date of birth and residential address with credit-reference data. For almost all of the pre-requirement period, a customer had to pass the selfie check and did not have to pass the address check. Address verification had been withdrawn as an onboarding control in early 2019. Monzo had concluded it was not a reliable indicator of criminal propensity. The firm’s own look-back, recorded in the notice, found that about 20 percent of existing current-account customers had previously failed the check, and that 47 percent of customers then considered higher risk had failed it. That is why the control came off. The notice’s point is what came off with it. Systems were calibrated to accept UK postcodes. They were not calibrated to notice that a UK postcode can sit under an address that is not a home. The notice records obviously implausible UK addresses, including well-known London landmarks. It names Buckingham Palace, 10 Downing Street, and Monzo’s own business address. It also records PO boxes, mail-forwarding addresses, addresses of customers the firm had already offboarded, invalid UK addresses containing non-UK details, and foreign addresses carrying UK postcodes. Customers applied with a UK address and then reordered the card to a non-UK address, sometimes quickly. Multiple customers used the same address where the firm had not fully assessed muling risk. For most of that period Monzo promoted the lack of address verification on its site and on social channels, and offered a “Same day Monzo” service that let customers transact before the physical card arrived at the address given at signup. By the end of the period the firm itself held concerns that the missing check had affected how many customers arrived intending to use the bank for financial crime. It put address verification back. In May 2020 its annual financial-crime report to the Authority required a total of UK-based relationships. The notice says the combination of the missing check and the monitoring gaps led Monzo to doubt the accuracy of reporting every customer as UK-based, and that it filed the report with an explanation of that doubt. A firm that cannot sign its own regulatory return is a firm whose onboarding file is not finished.

The requirement it then broke

In August 2020 the failings produced two things at once. The FCA required a comprehensive independent review of the financial-crime framework, and it imposed a requirement that stopped Monzo opening new accounts for high-risk customers. Between August 2020 and June 2022 the firm repeatedly failed to comply with that requirement. The press release’s summary is that Monzo signed up over 34,000 high-risk customers while the restriction was in force. The notice splits the number, and the split is the one to keep. On the notice’s account, Monzo opened 33,039 accounts in breach of the requirement, of which 26,325 were for high-risk customers. Separately, at times during the same period, it failed to apply some of the requirement’s controls to new or additional applications, and at times applied those controls to the wrong information. Those instances were connected to 167,444 accounts opened in the period. The firm estimates that they may have led to the onboarding of 34,262 high-risk customers. The press figure and the notice figure are not rivals. One is the headline. The other is the working. Quote the working if a counterparty asks “how many.” The notice also says relevant data that Monzo did collect at onboarding, including tax residency, identity-document type, IP address and adverse media, was not used when the firm decided customer risk. In a sample of automated alerts, seven of twenty reviewers did not address the alerting transactions in the decision. Monitoring that does not read the alert is the same shape of failure as an address field that accepts a palace. Both are controls that exist in a diagram and not in the file.

What the skilled person later signed

This is not a story that ends in 2022 and then goes quiet. The skilled person produced a series of reports. In August 2024 a final report recorded that all but one recommendation had been fully met, and that Monzo should, going forward, be equipped to manage financial-crime risk commensurate with the size, scale and complexity of the business. The last recommendation was met in November 2024. The Authority’s notice acknowledges a financial-crime change programme and the firm’s commitment to keeping the framework effective. Remediation is part of the public record. It does not rewrite the years in which the address check was off, or the years in which the requirement was missed. A 2026 onboarding pack that cites the change programme and does not cite the notice is half a pack. Faircroft’s use of the case is the control, not the brand. Challenger banks are allowed to exist on this desk. They are not allowed to be summarised as an app. The question a correspondent or a sponsor actually has is whether the firm can show, for the book it has now, that address, risk rating and alert disposition are three records rather than one marketing sentence. Monzo’s notice is useful because it shows those three coming apart in order: the check withdrawn, the rating starved of data the firm already held, the alert closed without the transactions.

What to put in the file

Keep four pages. The final notice, not the write-up. The press release, for the tenth-fine sentence and the growth figures, marked as the Authority’s summary. The skilled person’s endpoint, August and November 2024, so the remediation date is not “recently.” And a one-line note of which number you are using when someone says 34,000: the firm’s estimate of high-risk onboardings tied to control failures during the requirement, as distinct from the 33,039 accounts the notice says were opened in breach, 26,325 of them high-risk. Mixing those counts is how a true notice becomes a loose one. Ask a respondent that clears for, or sponsors, a fast-growing UK bank whether address verification is a condition of opening or a condition of a later review. Ask whether a formal requirement has ever sat on the firm, and for the date it was lifted. Ask for the last skilled-person or equivalent close-out, by month. If the answer is a growth chart, you have not been answered. The Monzo notice is public. The only work left is to read the paragraphs that sit under the fine.