Starling screened customers against 39 names out of 3,088
From July 2017 to January 2023 the bank’s automated screen matched individuals on the UK consolidated list only where the entry carried UK citizenship or UK residency. The FCA’s 2024 notice also records 54,359 accounts opened for high-risk customers against a requirement that forbade it.
Growth, then a requirement, then the accounts anyway
The Financial Conduct Authority fined Starling Bank Limited £28,959,426. The press release is dated 2 October 2024. The Authority’s own list of 2024 fines dates the notice to 27 September. Use the notice when you are citing the penalty maths and the press release when you are citing the announcement. Starling settled. Without the 30 percent discount the penalty would have been £40,959,426. It was imposed under section 206 for a breach of Principle 3 and for contravening a requirement the bank had accepted. The growth figures in the notice are the scale against which the controls are judged. Revenue went from £13,000 in 2016 to £452.8 million in 2023. The customer base went from about 43,000 in 2017 to about 3.6 million in 2023. Inbound cross-border payments went from 385 in 2017 to 236,527 in 2020 and to more than a million in 2023. A bank that starts as a domestic app and then clears that many international payments is a different sanctions institution from the one that wrote the first policy. The notice says the controls did not keep pace. Starling has accepted that finding. Acceptance is not the analysis. The analysis is which control, and for how long. In 2021 the Authority reviewed financial-crime controls at challenger banks and wrote to Starling on 11 March with wide concerns about anti-money-laundering and sanctions controls, governance, and process. Starling started an enhancement plan and, in September 2021, accepted a voluntary requirement: do not open new accounts for high-risk or higher-risk customers until the framework improved. Between 17 September 2021 and the notice, Starling opened 54,359 accounts for 49,183 such customers, in breach of that requirement. The Authority’s point about a requirement is blunt. Once it is on the firm, the firm has to build the control that can obey it, and then watch that control. Starling did not implement every limb of the requirement properly, and did not adequately monitor its own compliance. A second-line review later found further accounts. By November 2022 Starling had raised its financial-crime risk rating to red. The Authority wrote again on 31 March 2023, recognised the money spent, and said the volume of high-risk accounts opened without detection showed the bank had not applied the rigour the requirement needed. It also recorded disappointment that the first breaches were not reported immediately. Daily automated checks on the requirement, introduced in January 2023 and fully in place by 31 May 2023, cut the breaches sharply. By the end of the period Starling had assurance over the requirement, and third-party testing found the remediated customer and payment screens operating effectively. The bank also rescreened its customer base and payments back to 2017. That endpoint belongs in the file. It does not shorten 2021 and 2022.
Thirty-nine names
The sanctions finding is separate, and it is the one to remember. Starling’s own second line found, on 30 January 2023, that the automated customer screen had produced no sanctions alerts on individual customers between 1 July 2022 and that date. The cause was a misconfiguration that had existed since 20 July 2017. Customers and prospective customers were screened only against individuals on the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation consolidated list who had UK citizenship or UK residency. That was 39 of 3,088 designated persons. For more than five years the screen was, for individuals, a domestic extract of a list that is not domestic. The notice says there was a material risk that a designated person could open an account, or keep one after the list changed. Starling identified that, during the period, at least one designated person did open an account. One is not a comfort statistic. A screen aimed at 39 names cannot tell you how many of the other 3,049 it would have stopped. The bank took immediate steps on the misconfiguration, then found the problem was wider than one switch: risk assessment, policy, testing and calibration, and the absence of management information on alert volumes and trends. Other settings belonged to a smaller bank and were never retired. Customers were screened against the consolidated list once every 14 days, a leftover metric, and the screen ran after onboarding rather than before it. Not all cross-border payments were screened, though those payments are the higher sanctions risk. Payments that were screened were put through a tool built for customer screening, not for payments. Until the first quarter of 2023 there was no second-line assurance on sanctions screening, and the third-line audit was delayed into the third quarter of 2023. The review described a capability gap at governance: people responsible for the control did not have a sufficient grasp of what the consolidated list is, or of the risk parameters in a screen.
The policy said one thing and the screen did another
In the March 2021 letter the Authority had already noticed the split. Starling’s policy said customers and transactions were screened against UK, European Union, United Nations and US Treasury lists. In practice the bank screened customers against sanctions records for people known to reside in the UK or to have UK links. It was not screening records for people in other countries, including the United States, even though payments were being made in dollars. A policy that names OFAC and a screen that does not load OFAC is not a conservative interpretation. It is a document and a system that have stopped referring to each other. On 24 February 2022 the Authority wrote to a large set of firms, Starling included, about the Russian sanctions changes. The letter said screens should cover new customers, payments and existing customers against the current consolidated list, and should be capable of moving when the regime moved. Eleven months later the bank discovered it had been matching individuals against 39 names since 2017. The letter did not create the duty. It is the date after which “we had not been told” is unavailable. Firms were already obliged not to provide funds to designated persons. The Authority does not impose the sanctions. It supervises whether the firms it authorises can comply with them. OFSI keeps the list and can penalise a breach. This notice is about the system that was supposed to see the list. The penalty maths sit on revenue, not on a tariff per missed name. For the breach window of 1 December 2019 to 30 November 2023 the Authority took relevant revenue of £1,119,042,195, judged seriousness at level 4, and applied 15 percent. You do not need the step-two arithmetic to use the case. You need it so that a summary which says “about £29 million for growth” is replaced with the two failures the notice actually prices: a requirement that was not obeyed, and a sanctions screen that was pointed at the wrong slice of the list.
What to keep
Keep four pages. The notice. The 39-of-3,088 sentence, with the dates 20 July 2017 and 30 January 2023. The VREQ count, 54,359 accounts and 49,183 customers, kept separate from the sanctions count. And Starling’s own statement that it found the requirement breaches, told the Authority, and has paid the fine as settlement. A correspondent or a sponsor asking about a fast UK bank should ask what fraction of the consolidated list the customer screen loads, whether payment screening is a different tool, whether screening happens before the account exists, and whether any requirement on high-risk onboarding is checked by a daily job rather than by a quarterly narrative. This page will not say Starling set out to bank designated persons. It will say the screen, as configured, could not see most individuals on the list, and that at least one designated person opened an account in that condition. It will not treat the 2023 repair as a reason to skip the notice. The repair is why the current screen may be fine. The notice is why you ask for the test that proves it, instead of the year the app launched.